Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2015

Do Immigrants Have Freedom of Speech?
Michael Kagan
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Immigration Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Kagan, Michael, "Do Immigrants Have Freedom of Speech?" (2015). Scholarly Works. 918.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/918

This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

California Law Review Circuit
VOL. 6

SEPTEMBER 2015
Copyright © 2015 by California Law Review, Inc.

Do Immigrants Have Freedom of
Speech?
By Michael Kagan*
The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently argued that
immigrants who have not been legally admitted to the United States
have no right to claim protections under the First Amendment. This
Essay explores the complicated and conflicted case law governing
immigrants’ free speech rights, and argues that, contrary to the DOJ
position, all people in the United States are protected by the First
Amendment. Moreover, it argues that for reasons that have not been
widely appreciated, Citizens United v. FEC offers significant
doctrinal support for immigrant speech rights because it articulates a
strong rule against speech discrimination based on identity rather
than content.
INTRODUCTION
On May 7, 2015, DOJ lawyers in the federal district court in San Antonio,
Texas, made a startling argument: immigrants who are not legally admitted into
the United States do not have free speech rights under the First Amendment.1 If
DOJ is right, then millions of unauthorized immigrants in the United States
could in the future be censored or punished for speaking their minds,
undermining the efforts of the many who have already spoken out in support of

*. J.D., University of Michigan Law School; B.A., Northwestern University. Associate
Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. I am grateful for
the advice and suggestions that I received from Aaron Caplan. All errors are mine.
1. Federal Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Pineda-Cruz v. Thompson, No. SA-15-CV-326-XR
(W.D. Tex. May 7, 2015), 2015 WL 3922298.
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comprehensive immigration reform and the Dream Act.2 Moreover, since the
First Amendment covers more than speech, the DOJ argument has implications
for other fundamental rights, including freedom of religion.
As I will explain in this Essay, the government did not need to make such
a sweeping assertion to defend itself in Pineda-Cruz v. Thompson, a case about
the treatment of immigrant detainees in the custody of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). But I will not dwell on the government’s
motivations for making this argument. This Essay will focus on the narrow free
speech question: Is DOJ right? Do immigrants who have not been lawfully
admitted have no free speech rights?
This Essay concludes that immigrants who are in the United States have
free speech rights, regardless of how they arrived and their current status under
the immigration statutes. This Essay further argues that any other result would
be anathema to our system of civil liberties. Finally, this Essay posits that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC considerably strengthens
immigrants’ claims to free speech, because the Court held there that the
government may not silence expression based on the identity of the speaker.
I.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S POSITION IN PINEDA-CRUZ
Pineda-Cruz v. Thompson is a class action lawsuit by Central American
mothers who arrived with their children as part of an influx of people fleeing
gang violence in 2013 and 2014.3 While previously DHS typically released
similarly situated asylum seekers while their cases proceeded in Immigration
Court, in June 2014, DHS began detaining mothers and children together.4 By
the time of the lawsuit, DHS had detained around three hundred mothers with
their children in a facility in Karnes, Texas.5 In March 2015, around eighty
detainees decided to protest their conditions there.6 The mothers circulated a
petition asserting that their continued detention was unjust and declaring their
refusal to eat, a move that initiated a five-day hunger strike.7
On April 23, 2015, the mothers filed suit, claiming that the detention
center’s punishment of their hunger strike violated the First Amendment.8 They
alleged that Immigration and Custom Enforcement officials threatened to take
away their children by deporting the mothers and sending the children to

2. See, e.g., DOCUMENTED (Apo Productions 2013); UNITED WE DREAM,
http://unitedwedream.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
3. Complaint at 6, Pineda-Cruz v. Thompson, No. SA-15-CV-326-XR (W.D. Tex. Apr. 23,
2015), 2015 WL 1868560.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 3–4.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 13.

86

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:84

different facilities.9 They also alleged that the leaders of the protest were put
into dark and unsanitary isolation cells, and the hunger strikers were fired from
detention center jobs.10
The government asserted a number of the narrow defenses available to
it.11 With respect to free speech, DOJ pointed to Turner v. Safley, which
established a test permitting the government to infringe on a person’s
constitutional rights in prison if the regulation is “reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”12 Under this favorable standard, DOJ argued
that its interests in the security and well-being of detainees justified the
measures taken at Karnes.13 However, in the alternative, DOJ offered a second,
broader defense against the plaintiff’s constitutional claims: immigrants who
have not been lawfully admitted simply have no First Amendment rights at
all.14 According to DOJ, the plaintiffs “are not lawfully present in the United
States nor can they claim that they were lawfully admitted.”15 In immigration
law, “admission” is “lawful entry . . . after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.”16 In contrast, “lawful resident aliens” are “present within
the constitution’s jurisdiction.”17 Also, according to DOJ, the plaintiffs lacked
constitutionally relevant connections to the United States because they never
had a lawful immigration status and spent relatively little time in the country
before being apprehended.18 For these reasons, DOJ argued that the plaintiffs
could not claim protection under the First Amendment, even if their complaints
would be valid if lodged by a citizen or lawful resident.

9. Id. at 14.
10. Id. at 6–9.
11. For example, DOJ claims that the government has sovereign immunity. Defendants’
Memorandum, supra note 1, at 4.
12. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
13. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 1, at 8. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a
temporary injunction without a written decision. Pineda-Cruz v. Johnson, No. 26 Civ. 326 (W.D. Tex.
May 8, 2015). According to a media report, Judge Xavier Rodriguez said in open court that plaintiffs
had not shown they were likely to prevail but reserved decision on whether they could claim protection
under the First Amendment. See Jason Buch & Guillermo Contreras, Karnes Detainees Dealt a Loss
in Court, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (May 7, 2015, 9:10 PM), http://www.expressnews.com/
news/local/article/Karnes-detainees-testify-about-retaliation-6249686.php.
14. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5–6.
15. Id. at 6.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2012). In its brief, DOJ did not clarify how much of its argument
depended on lack of legal admission versus lack of lawful presence or alternatively, lack of
connections to the United States. These are overlapping but distinct concepts. Some non-citizens who
are unlawfully present were nevertheless legally admitted, for instance, if they overstayed a tourist
visa. But if the main issue is a lack of connections to the United States, an obvious question would
arise about how long someone must remain in the United States before acquiring First Amendment
rights. If DOJ intended only to argue that recent arrivals lack First Amendment protection, it did not
make this clear in its brief. The brief discusses the duration of residency in the United States as only a
secondary factor.
17. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6.
18. Id.
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II.
COULD THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BE RIGHT?: STATING THE STRONGEST
POSSIBLE CASE
This Section summarizes the doctrinal foundation for the DOJ argument
and the strongest possible case for DOJ’s position that non-citizens not
lawfully admitted or lawfully present in the United States should not enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment. But first, it is important to understand the
wide implications of DOJ’s argument. DHS estimated in 2012 that 11.4 million
people in the United States are not in the country lawfully.19 Of this group, the
majority were not legally admitted.20 This subset includes people brought to the
United States as children, including many who have become “Dreamers” or
prominent activists for immigration reform.21 DOJ’s argument would mean that
these activists, encompassing 6.8 million people in the United States, do not
enjoy the constitutional protection of freedom of speech.22
Broadly speaking, there are two main arguments supporting DOJ’s
position. First, DOJ may argue that the federal government’s plenary power to
regulate immigration overrides any First Amendment claims that unlawfully
admitted immigrants may make. Second, DOJ may argue that unlawfully
admitted immigrants are not part of “the people” for constitutional purposes.
A. Plenary Power over Immigration Trumps the First Amendment
There are several cases where the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment offers little or no constraint on the federal government’s power to
regulate immigration.23 In the canon of immigration law, the classic case
concerning the intersection of First Amendment rights and the federal
government’s power to exclude non-citizens is Kleindienst v. Mandel. In that
1972 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the government’s authority to
refuse a visa to a “Belgian Socialist” who was invited to speak at American
universities.24 The Court recognized that excluding an invited speaker

19. BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE
UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2012, at 1 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf.
20. The portion of the unauthorized population that entered legally and overstayed a
temporary visa is estimated at 40 percent. See Sara Murray, Many in U.S. Illegally Overstayed Their
Visas, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323916304578404960101110032.
21. See generally UNITED WE DREAM, supra note 2.
22. This estimate is based on the 11.4 million total unauthorized population and the estimate
that 60 percent of them entered without being admitted legally.
23. For a general discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see generally Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV.
255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
24. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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implicated free speech interests, specifically the right of United States citizens
to receive information.25 Nonetheless, the Court found that the federal
government’s vast plenary power to control entrance into the United States
overcame any First Amendment objections.26
In other instances, the Court held that the federal government may deport
non-citizens because of their political beliefs and associations. In United States
ex rel. Turner v. Williams, the Court approved the deportation of an English
anarchist, holding that the inherent sovereign power of the United States to
govern admission of non-citizens overcame any First Amendment defenses.27
In Galvan v. Press, the Court reached a similar holding regarding the
deportation of a “Mexican Communist” who had been a U.S. resident for
thirty-six years.28 The Court deferred to the political branches to answer
questions about who should be allowed into the country, reasoning that “[t]he
power of Congress over the admission of aliens and their right to remain is
necessarily very broad.”29 The Court allowed Galvan’s deportation over the
dissents of Justices Black and Douglas who complained, “I am unwilling to say
[ ] that despite these constitutional safeguards this man may be driven from our
land because he joined a political party that California and the Nation then
recognized as perfectly legal.”30
These cases have not been overruled directly though there is some reason
for caution about whether the Court today would go quite as far. Perhaps most
famously, in the 1970s, John Lennon successfully resisted deportation in part
by arguing that he was a victim of selective prosecution because of his political
activism.31 But federal court jurisdiction to hear such cases was foreclosed by
the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee.32 In that case, the government sought to deport a
group of people because of their membership in a leftist Palestinian
organization and technical violations of immigration law.33 The government
dropped the political membership ground after the group challenged the
deportation as unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court found that the
government could proceed on the facially neutral, technical grounds.34

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 763.
Id. at 766.
194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904).
347 U.S. 522 (1954).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 533 (Black, J., dissenting).
See Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975).
525 U.S. 471 (1999).
Id. at 473–74.
Id.
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Because of the resolution of the case on technical grounds, AmericanArab sends an ambiguous signal.35 However, the Court’s unequivocal
language, which declared that “an alien unlawfully in this country has no
constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his
deportation,”36 gives the government a significant sword to wield over the
heads of the 11.4 million unauthorized immigrants in the country. Any
unlawfully admitted immigration is removable simply because he or she is
present in violation of the law.37 In this way, unlawfully admitted immigrants
are subject to a kind of retribution for the same political activities that U.S.
citizens can engage in with immunity.38 Thus, Williams, Galvan, and
American-Arab arguably support the DOJ’s position in Pineda-Cruz:
immigrants cannot call on the First Amendment for protection vis-à-vis the
federal government.
B. Immigrants May Not be Part of “The People”
DOJ may raise yet a second argument that the protections of the Bill of
Rights extend only to “the people,” not all “persons” under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Constitution uses “the people” rather than “citizens,” limiting
“citizens” to those with the right to vote and run for office.39 In Pineda-Cruz,
DOJ relied on a series of cases where the Court suggested that some
constitutional rights accrue to an immigrant only as he or she gains connections
to American society. Of particular note, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
the Court said that “aliens receive constitutional protection when they have
come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this county.”40 DOJ may use the reference to “substantial
connections” to suggest that unlawful presence in the country depletes a noncitizen’s claim to constitutional protections. In fact, the Court in VerdugoUrquidez offered a statement that seems, at least on the surface, highly
supportive of DOJ’s contention:
35. The majority in American-Arab held open the possibility of a “rare case” where the
discrimination based on political opinion is “so outrageous” that the result would be different. Id. at
491.
36. Id. at 488.
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2012).
38. David Cole has eloquently described this reality. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals
Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 377 (2003) (“If
a foreign national has no First Amendment rights in the deportation setting, he has no First
Amendment rights anywhere; the fear of deportation will always and everywhere restrict what he
says.”).
39. See id. at 370. Indeed, in Williams, Chief Justice Fuller wrote, “He does not become one of
the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by an attempt to enter, forbidden by
law. To appeal to the Constitution is to concede that this is a land governed by that supreme law, and
as under it the power to exclude has been determined to exist, those who are excluded cannot assert the
rights in general obtaining in a land to which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise.” United
States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904).
40. 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
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“[T]he people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First
and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved
in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who
are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.41
This interpretation is also supported by recent lower court decisions
holding that unauthorized immigrants cannot claim the right to bear arms under
the Second Amendment. In its divided two-to-one decision in United States v.
Portillo-Munoz,42 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit echoed the
Supreme Court, observing that only six provisions of the Bill of Rights are
limited to “the people.”43 Based on this foundation, the appellate court found
that a non-citizen who is in the United States illegally is not part of the political
community known as “the people” in the Bill of Rights.44
These intersecting lines of case law provide some doctrinal support for the
DOJ’s position. But, as we will see in Sections III and IV, there are
countervailing doctrines as well.
III.
PUTTING THE ANTI-SPEECH ARGUMENTS IN CONTEXT
A. Plenary Power is Subject to Constitutional Limits
The first counterpoint concerns the government’s plenary power to
regulate immigration. The Supreme Court’s treatment of immigration
enforcement has changed considerably since Williams, Galvan, and even
Verdugo-Urquidez. Since then, the Court has grown more willing to impose

41. Id. at 265.
42. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).
43. Id. at 440.
44. Id. This line of reasoning is potentially very broad, implicating far more than the right to
bear arms, and it has led one judge to pointedly dissent from the Portillo-Munoz decision. See id. at
443 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s determination that Portillo-Munoz is not part of ‘the
people’ effectively means that millions of similarly situated residents of the United States are ‘nonpersons’ who have no rights to be free from unjustified searches of their homes and bodies and other
abuses, nor to peaceably assemble or petition the government.”). The majority hedged on whether
other civil liberties could be abridged for immigrants, suggesting that the term “the people” might have
a different meaning in different amendments. Id. at 440–41. But this may clash with the Supreme
Court’s premise in District of Columbia v. Heller that “the people” is a “term of art” used with a
consistent meaning in multiple amendments. 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008); see also Portillo-Munoz, 643
F.3d at 444 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (disputing whether “the people” can have different meanings in
different amendments). On the other hand, courts have found that immigrants in the United States can
claim Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, suggesting that “the
people” may indeed mean different things in different amendments. See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares v.
Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014), 2014 WL 1414305 (detaining an
immigrant without a judicial warrant violated the Fourth Amendment).
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constitutional constraints on immigration enforcement.45 Most important of all,
in 2001, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis held that the federal
government’s power to enforce immigration law “is subject to important
constitutional limitations.”46 Zadvydas concerned due process rights in
detention, but the Court did not limit its decision to that context.47 Given the
importance of freedom of speech, the right also belongs in the category of
fundamental rights from which all people in the United States may benefit.48
B. Free Speech Does Not Belong Only to “The People”
The second counterpoint concerns the argument that immigrants are not
part of “the people” of United States. The Bill of Rights is explicit that only
“the people” may claim Second Amendment rights: “the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms.”49 But the text of the First Amendment is very different. It
is framed as a limitation on government power (“Congress shall make no
law”), rather than as a grant of rights to the people.50 Moreover, the First
Amendment ties “the people” only to the right to assemble and petition the
government; freedom of speech, the press, and religious exercise are phrased in
general terms.51 As a result, there is nothing in the First Amendment’s text
suggesting that freedom of speech is limited to “the people,” even assuming the
group would not include immigrants unlawfully admitted to the United
States.52 This supports the proposition that everyone in the United States enjoys
freedom of speech under the First Amendment.

45. For a general account of the rise and decline of plenary power, see Michael Kagan,
Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
46. 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
47. Id. at 694 (discussing United States v. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896) (striking
down a federal statute imposing hard labor on Chinese individuals found unlawfully in the United
States and finding that unlawfully present immigrants could not be sentenced to involuntary servitude
or slavery)).
48. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 429 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Free
speech and press within the meaning of the First Amendment are, in my judgment, among the preeminent privileges and immunities of all citizens.”).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I; cf. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir.
2011) (distinguishing the Fourth and Second amendments because the Fourth Amendment “is at its
core a protective right against abuses by the government” while the Second Amendment “grants an
affirmative right”).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”).
52. The textual difference between the First Amendment’s treatment of speech, press, and
religion, and the right to assemble and petition the government may reflect a distinction between basic
rights of personal autonomy on the one hand and rights of self-government on the other.
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C. Foreign Location May Matter More Than Citizenship
A third caveat concerns the DOJ’s reliance on Verdugo-Urquidez. That
case does indeed say that First Amendment rights are limited to members of the
national community, though the Court did not specify if it meant all First
Amendment rights or just freedom of assembly.53 However the Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez was not actually deciding anything about the rights of
immigrants in the United States. This was a case about the relevance of the
Fourth Amendment to the arrest of a Mexican in Mexico.54 This is also true of
Kleindienst v. Mandel, since the non-citizen there was outside the United
States, seeking permission to enter.55 Such cases may be explained by the
general rule that constitutional rights do not necessarily apply outside U.S.
territory, though as the Court made clear in Boumediene v. Bush, constitutional
rights can apply abroad in some circumstances.56 There is little need to delve
into the extraterritorial question in order to analyze the free speech rights of
people who are inside the United States.57
D. The Court Has Embraced Immigrant Speech Rights (For Legal
Immigrants)
Finally, the Supreme Court has at least twice said that the First
Amendment applies to non-citizens in the country. In Bridges v. Wixon, the
Court said, “Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this
country.”58 In Chew v. Colding, the Court said in a footnote that neither the
First nor Fifth Amendment distinguishes between citizens and “resident
aliens.”59 But these cases also highlight a problem. In Chew, the Court said:
“[O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders.”60 The Court in Chew did not say whether those who enter unlawfully
are not entitled to rights, but its narrow language suggests that at least some
rights may not apply. Bridges did not include such limiting language, but at the
same time, that case involved a lawful immigrant who had lived in the United

53. See supra Section II.
54. The Supreme Court has explained that Verdugo-Urquidez stands only for the principle that
certain constitutional protections are territorially limited to the United States. See Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
55. See supra Section II.
56. 553 U.S. 723, 759–64 (2008) (adopting a “functional” and “practical” approach to
extraterritorial application of constitutional rights).
57. Cf. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an
entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”).
58. 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471, 497 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is well settled that ‘[f]reedom of speech . . . is
accorded aliens’” (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148)).
59. 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.5 (1953).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
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States for more than two decades.61 Because no Supreme Court case has
squarely reached the question of whether free speech rights apply to
immigrants that entered unlawfully, one may raise doubts about the application
of cases that concerned legal immigrants.62
E. A Close Question?
In sum, while there is good reason to think that freedom of speech applies
to everyone in the United States, there is little definitive case law on point.
And, as we have seen, there are cases where the Court has permitted the federal
government to single out disfavored political groups at least in the context of
deciding whether to exclude or deport a non-citizen. However, a recent case,
Citizens United v. FEC,63 has added an important, new dimension to free
speech law, which should strongly favor immigrant free speech rights.
IV.
SPEAKER DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE IN CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
A. Citizens United v. FEC
Free speech law has traditionally focused on content-based censorship, in
which the government attempts to prevent discussion about certain subjects or
from certain viewpoints,64 or to restrict people with disfavored ideologies from
accessing public fora.65 To focus on the identity of the speaker is a different
type of regulation; the government looks to who the person is, not what the
person might say. The DOJ position asserted in Pineda-Cruz is an example of
such identity-based speech restrictions. A surprising dearth of First
Amendment case law directly tackles this kind of speech restriction. But the
good news for immigrants is that identity-based speech restrictions were a
central issue in Citizens United. The bad news, perhaps, is that because Citizens
United is such a divisive decision, given its impact on campaign finance
regulation, there has been little attention paid to this aspect of the decision, and
doubts remain as to how to (or if to) apply the Court’s reasoning in that case.66

61. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 137–38.
62. Cf. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2011) (arguing that the
Supreme Court decision that struck down a measure that discriminated against immigrants only
applied to lawful immigrants).
63. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
64. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (holding that prohibitions on
content discrimination are “the guiding . . . principle” of First Amendment law); Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) (summarizing the Court’s jurisprudence restricting contentbased restrictions on expression).
65. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Ind. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (holding that a city may not
prohibit Communists from accessing a public forum).
66. See generally Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of Free Speech,
42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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In Citizens United, a regulation prohibited a non-profit organization from
making independent campaign expenditures because of the non-profit’s status.
In that case, the non-profit made a film criticizing Hillary Clinton.67 The Court
had to decide whether the identity of the speaker was relevant to free speech
law. The majority stated decisively68: “Prohibited, too, are restrictions
distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not
others. . . . Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content,
moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it
identifies certain preferred speakers.”69 Because Citizens United says that
speaker discrimination may offend the Constitution, an identity-based speech
restriction should attract heightened scrutiny, just as a content-based speech
restriction would.70
Despite the broad prohibition on speaker discrimination articulated in
Citizens United, the Court has approved strict prohibitions on non-citizen
expressive activity in the narrow context of campaign finance regulation. The
most recent instance was a one-line, per curiam decision in Bluman v. FEC,
which upheld a federal statute that banned non-citizens from donating to the
election campaigns of candidates for federal office.71 But, if anything, Bluman
confirms the general principle that speech restrictions targeting immigrants are
constitutionally problematic. In the decision affirmed by the Supreme Court,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny,72 the level of scrutiny
the Supreme Court required in Citizens United for government-imposed
identity-based speech restrictions. Moreover, the court of appeals explicitly
limited the decision to specific expressive activities “that are part of democratic
self-government in the United States.”73 Thus, under this narrow exception, the
government may restrict non-citizens from campaign donations, voting, and
jury service.74 But the Bluman decision is clear that the compelling interest in
self-government that justifies banning campaign donations by immigrants

67. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
68. For a discussion of the four-justice dissent’s views on this aspect of Citizens United, see
Kagan, supra note 66.
69. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
70. The Court acknowledged that some legitimate speech restrictions disadvantage certain
classes of people, but that such cases are typically tied to certain government contexts, such as schools
or prisons, not to the identity of the people involved. See id. at 341 (“[T]hese rulings were based on an
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”); see also Kagan, supra note 66
(discussing the intersection of speaker discrimination doctrine and case law limiting speech in certain
non-public fora).
71. Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (per curiam).
72. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (deciding that the regulation
could survive even strict scrutiny review and thus, refusing to determine which level of scrutiny
applied), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
73. Id. at 283.
74. Id.
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“does not bar foreign nationals from issue advocacy.”75 Thus, if anything,
Bluman supports the general rule that immigrants are not excluded from the
protection of the First Amendment.
B. Policy Implications of the Discrimination Doctrine
To appreciate the importance of the speaker discrimination principle, it is
worth pausing to consider the implications for democracy if the government
could silence undocumented immigrants. Immigration policy is one of the great
subjects of political debate of our time. The central debate concerns what
should happen to non-citizens who enter or remain in the country unlawfully.
The question thus is whether the voices of those most affected by this debate
have a right to participate in it. Many of those individuals most affected have
already participated, including marching in demonstrations, and in some cases
becoming high profile activists honored by the President.76 Their participation
in the national debate attaches a personal face to the policy question, much as
the “coming out” movement personalized the campaign for LGBT equality.77
A central reason why the First Amendment should protect non-citizens is
that, in a democracy, it is essential that the general public hear directly from
those affected by a public policy. In the detention context, this principle is
illustrated by the contrast between Turner v. Safley and an earlier prisoners’
rights case, Procunier v. Martinez.78 In Safley, the Court approved restrictions
on inmate-to-inmate correspondence because “mail between [prisoners in
different] institutions can be used to communicate escape plans and to arrange
assaults and other violent acts.”79 But in Procunier, the Court struck down a
prison regulation that prevented inmates from writing letters to people outside
the prison system to complain or express grievances about prison conditions.80
The Court in Procunier recognized that censorship of speech impacts both the
speaker and the intended audience.81 More to the point, inmates would lose
their ability to tell the public outside the prison about problems directly
affecting them inside.82
75. Id. at 284; see also id. at 288 (“[T]he United States has a compelling interest for purposes
of First Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of American
democratic self-government.”).
76. See, e.g., Amanda Sakuma, Astrid Silva: Obama Lifts One Immigrant’s Story Out of the
Shadows, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 20, 2014, 9:41 PM) (updated Nov. 21, 2014, 5:36 PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-lifts-one-immigrants-story-out-the-shadows.
77. See Julie Bolcer, Poll Shows Power of Coming Out, ADVOCATE.COM (June 6, 2012, 9:53
AM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2012/06/06/poll-shows-power-coming-out
(citing data showing dramatic growth since the 1990s in the number of Americans who know that a
person close to them is gay, corresponding with a dramatic shift in opinions about marriage equality).
78. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
79. 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987).
80. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 398–99.
81. Id. at 408–09; see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–65 (1972).
82. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413 (“Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence
simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements.”); id. at 427
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It is true that if the people affected by a public policy are silenced, their
allies can still advocate on their behalf. But this advocacy is more abstract,
centering on a voiceless third person who is never heard from directly. In other
First Amendment contexts, the Court has recognized that a political message is
more potent if the audience can visibly connect it to speakers who have a
unique personal connection to the issue.83 In addition, forcing marginalized
people to rely on others to advocate for their interests reinforces a power
hierarchy, privileging one person while stripping the person who is directly
affected of his or her voice. In explaining why speaker discrimination offends
the First Amendment, Justice Kennedy in Citizens United wrote that excluding
a person or group of people from the right to speak “deprives the disadvantaged
person or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing,
and respect for the speaker’s voice.”84 Citizens United thus articulates a
compelling, progressive reason to encourage a diversity of voices in public life
and to closely scrutinize any government attempt to exclude a speaker based on
who they are, which is the logical result of the DOJ’s argument in PinedaCruz.
CONCLUSION
The DOJ position in Pineda-Cruz should be deeply disturbing; it suggests
that millions of people in the United States could be deprived of fundamental
rights, starting with, but not necessarily limited to, freedom of speech. The
position is arguably supported by case law, especially cases like Williams,
Galvan, and American-Arab, which bar First Amendment defenses to
deportation, and case law that suggests that unauthorized immigrants may not
be part of “the people” in the Bill of Rights. However, the impact of these cases
should be limited, given that the Supreme Court has stated that the federal
government’s immigration authority is subject to constitutional limitations and
that non-citizens enjoy freedom of speech when they are inside the United
States. Unfortunately, the Court has not directly discussed whether non-citizens
have the freedom to speak when they are in the country unlawfully. As a result,
despite the alarming implications of the DOJ argument, the case law is not as
clear as one might hope.
This is why the speaker discrimination doctrine as articulated by Citizens
United is both critically important and refreshing. It articulates a general rule
that no class of people should be restricted from free expression based on who

(Marshall, J., concurring) (“Perhaps the most obvious victim of the indirect censorship effected by a
policy of allowing prison authorities to read inmate mail is criticism of prison administration.”).
83. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56–57 (1994) (“A sign advocating ‘Peace in the
Gulf’ in the front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction
than the same sign in a 10-year-old child’s bedroom window or the same message on a bumper sticker
of a passing automobile.”).
84. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010).
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they are without a compelling justification from the government. If the
immigrant speech question would otherwise be close, the speaker
discrimination doctrine explains why it must ultimately be resolved in favor of
free speech. Moreover, in Citizens United, the Court articulated why DOJ’s
argument eviscerates American democracy. By arguing that immigrants have
no right to speak, DOJ would deprive them of “worth, standing, and respect,”85
and literally the right to have their voice heard about matters that affect them.
That is why, as a matter of First Amendment law, DOJ is wrong to assert that
non-citizens who have not been lawfully admitted cannot claim protection
under the First Amendment. Everyone in the United States—including noncitizens regardless of their status under immigration law—enjoys the protection
of the First Amendment.

85.

Id.

